A ride on the Ridgeway bus by Gregory, Bob
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 3 – August 2017 – Page 3
Bob Gregory
A Ride on the 
RidgewAy Bus
Introduction
I grew up in Mornington, in those days a largely working-
class suburb of Wellington, in the city’s south-western 
hills. My father was a government tradesman (for all of his 
working life). As it happens, a next-door neighbour was 
one of the three public service commissioners. It was the 
late 1950s, and after work my father and the commissioner 
would often ride home together on a Wellington Tramways 
bus, departing from Courtenay Place and winding upwards 
through the steep streets of Vogeltown towards the Ridgeway 
terminus. They were both happy to be called ‘public servants’, 
though carrying out entirely different roles in New Zealand’s
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 ‘homely state’, as described by Janet Fraser, 
wife of former Labour prime minister 
Peter Fraser. My father and his fellow 
commuter were third-generation New 
Zealanders. Whereas the commissioner 
had received a tertiary education, my 
father, later a hungry reader, had left 
school at the age of 14. On the bus they 
talked mainly about how to coax the best 
vegetables out of their large and adjoining 
gardens. A spare man, the commissioner 
always alighted at the ‘penny section’, 
preferring to walk the remaining quarter 
of a mile to his house, instinctively frugal 
as well as mindful of his need for healthy 
exercise. Neither of them ever displayed 
or expressed any interest in sport, and 
they had not been caught up in the 1956 
national obsession, All Black victory over 
the touring Springbok rugby team. 
‘And it took me back to something
That I’d lost somewhere, somehow along  
the way.’
‘Sunday Morning Coming Down’, by Kris Kristofferson
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Notwithstanding Mrs Fraser’s 
sentiment, New Zealand in the 1950s was 
no democratic utopia. The nationwide 
industrial conflict of 1951 had 
demonstrated a government’s readiness 
and ability to heavily suppress New 
Zealanders’ civil and human rights, and 
although in those days there were no 
beggars on Wellington’s main streets, 
unlike today, there was massive inequality 
between the largely non-Mäori urban 
areas and rural Mäori, before the latter 
began to migrate in large numbers to the 
towns and cities. Yet the welfare state, built 
largely by the first Labour government of 
1935-49, was founded on an enduring 
political consensus, embodying a strong 
commitment to fairness and social equity. 
While New Zealand had been a world 
leader in introducing live radio coverage 
of parliamentary sittings, virtually all 
political commentary was conducted 
through the provincial daily newspapers. 
For Wellingtonians, the Evening Post and 
the Dominion provided the daily frames of 
largely establishment political reference, 
while the only radio news bulletin of the 
day, at 9pm, was prepared by government 
officials (there was no television). The 
nostalgic notion of ‘Mother’ England 
remained an integral part of the collective 
Päkehä consciousness, and many people 
regularly tuned into the news on the BBC’s 
World Service.
These memories were sparked by the 
invitation to discuss ‘governance issues’ for 
this pre-election edition of Policy Quarterly. 
In preparation, I noted down far too many 
to cover. They included the blame-shifting 
responses to tragedies that affect the lives of 
fellow New Zealanders, and the consequent 
lack of manifest accountability: Cave Creek 
22 years ago (14 dead), and more recently 
the Pike River mine (29 dead) and the CTV 
building collapse (115 dead), to mention 
just three deplorable cases. (Similar 
accountability shortcomings are apparent 
in the Hawke’s Bay water contamination 
incident last year.) There is a dearth of even 
semi-intelligent current affairs comment-
ary during evening prime time television, 
with the state broadcaster driven by 
commercial imperatives rather than public 
service values; the absence of any political 
party of the left that clearly and 
unambiguously promises to advance the 
interests of people who struggle to maintain 
decent living standards for themselves and 
their children; and the incarceration of 
growing numbers of young New Zealanders 
– disproportionately Mäori – in more and 
more prisons. Not to mention issues of 
housing affordability, environmental 
protection, immigration, mental health 
care, and so on. Collectively, they show that 
the idea of egalitarianism as fairness is 
today not as strongly embedded in the 
national psyche as it once was, and with 
markedly increased income inequality 
there is today greater social distance 
between those who are privileged and those 
who are much less so. 
The continuing dominance of 
technocratic neo-liberalism in New 
Zealand public policymaking since the 
mid-1980s, the betrayal of its own 
traditions by the fourth Labour 
government, the blindly ideological 
excesses of the National government’s 
1991 ‘Mother of all Budgets’, the 
emasculation of trade unions under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, and 
other factors have given the ‘homely’ state 
today a much less comforting feel. As 
declining polling numbers have shown, in 
a country that could once boast of 
exceptionally high voting turnouts, today 
far too many New Zealanders appear to be 
switched off by ‘politics’, which they have 
come to associate with self-interested 
opportunism, deceit and naked personal 
ambition. 
As I was reminiscing, along came two 
books – published almost simultaneously 
– which on the face of it have little or 
nothing in common. The first was Hit and 
Run: the New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan 
and the meaning of honour, by investigative 
journalists Nicky Hager and Jon 
Stephenson, and the second was Making 
Sense of Corruption, by Swedish political 
scientist Bo Rothstein and his research 
collaborator, Aiysha Varraich. Hager and 
Stephenson claimed that the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) hierarchy covered 
up from public scrutiny a botched raid 
involving the country’s Special Air Service 
(SAS) personnel on a couple of villages in 
Afghanistan in August 2010, which caused 
a number of civilian deaths, including that 
of a three-year-old girl. The authors called 
for a full and independent inquiry into the 
matter, in the public interest, especially to 
see whether war crimes might have been 
committed. 
In the second book the authors reason 
that, ‘If corruption is a special form of 
decay of the political system, we need to 
know what the opposite of this process is 
… in the absence of a single unified 
definition of corruption’ (p.10). In their 
view, which they admit is ‘far from 
uncontroversial’ (p.102), the opposite of 
corruption is impartiality. The impartiality 
they are concerned about relates to the 
‘output’ side of the governing process 
– that is, the system of public 
administration/management that imple-
ments public policy. In their words, 
‘impartiality is not a demand on actors on 
the input side of the political system but 
first and foremost an attribute of the 
actions taken by civil servants and 
professionals in public service, law 
enforcement personnel and the like (i.e 
the actors on the output side)’ (p.98). 
There can be no such thing as an ‘impartial’ 
public policy, only impartiality in its 
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execution. Therefore, ‘quality of 
government’ can be ‘operationalized and 
measured’ only on procedural 
(administrative) and not on substantive 
(policy) grounds. In this, impartiality 
means that, ‘when implementing laws and 
policies, government officials shall not 
take anything into consideration about 
the citizen/case that is not beforehand 
stipulated in the policy or the law’ (p.136). 
This approach does not imply that all 
public policies should provide equal 
treatment to all, only that all those who 
are directly affected by a policy should be 
treated impartially – without fear or 
favour, or consideration of any extraneous 
factors. They argue that while output 
impartiality in and of itself offers no 
guarantees against the adoption of 
morally reprehensible public policies (the 
Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust could 
implement the ‘final solution’ impartially), 
nevertheless empirical research shows 
that higher levels of ‘quality of 
government’, but not representative 
democracy, are positively correlated with 
human well-being and political legitimacy, 
and also are more likely to produce 
‘morally good outcomes’. In short, the 
essence of ‘good government’ is to be 
found in due process. 
Rothstein and Varraich argue that 
patronage, clientelism, patrimonialism 
and ‘state capture’ are all forms of 
corruption, even though officials who do 
not exercise impartial judgement and 
decision-making in their use of 
discretionary authority may not be 
seeking or accepting bribes or engaging in 
any other form of egregious malfeasance 
that is commonly understood to be 
corrupt. ‘State capture’ is largely a function 
of clientelism or patronage, whereby a 
mutually supportive and exclusionary 
relationship – often perfectly legal and 
institutionalised – is established, which 
‘excludes all citizens outside of the group 
from almost all parts of the political 
process in general’ (p.95). Established 
institutions ‘take advantage of and misuse 
the public trust’ (p.96). For example, the 
presence of a manifest ideology within a 
country’s judiciary, according to Rothstein 
and Varraich, would ‘remove the 
impartiality that the institution is meant 
to exercise in its judgements’ (p.96). In 
their view also, conflicts of interest fall 
within the ‘grey zone’ of corruption, 
because they involve ‘the distortion of 
impartiality’ (p.97). 
A corruptive failure of responsibility
Both books provide amply fuel for debate, 
in their own right, and the former has 
already generated a great deal of public 
discussion. On the other hand, discussion 
of the merits of Rothstein’s and Varraich’s 
arguments are likely to be confined to 
academics and others interested in the 
nature of governmental corruption 
and how to combat it. So what is the 
connection between the two publications?
Prime Minister Bill English has since 
rejected the call for a full and independent 
inquiry into the claims made by Hager 
and Stephenson. He was satisfied with 
assurances given him, along with some 
video evidence, by the chief of the NZDF, 
Lieutenant-General Tim Keating, who, in 
a news media presentation, pointed out 
some geographical errors in the book, 
while conceding that there could have 
been some civilian casualties. However, 
English’s decision not to hold a full and 
independent inquiry into the matters 
raised by Hager and Stephenson offends 
the principle of impartiality, as expressed 
by Rothstein and Varraich, and was thus 
corrupt and a manifestation of ‘bad 
government’. First, it means, in effect, that 
New Zealand’s head of government does 
not wish to determine – through a process 
that is and is seen to be impartial – 
whether soldiers acting with the approval 
of his office (in fact, his predecessor, (now 
Sir) John Key) were responsible for 
civilian casualties during the raids in 
question, and may therefore have 
committed war crimes, all in the name of 
New Zealand citizens. Secondly, his 
decision smacks of clientelism, 
patrimonialism and state capture. It is 
clientelist to the extent that the NZDF and 
the political executive enjoy what they 
deem to be a mutually supportive 
relationship beyond direct public scrutiny. 
It is patrimonial in its arbitrary dismissal 
of the possibility that the SAS committed 
war crimes: that is, breached the rule of 
international law. And it is an example of 
state capture to the extent that all those 
citizens – even if a minority – who would 
like to determine the truth of this matter 
will be denied the opportunity to do so, 
thus greatly limiting their ability to engage 
in the political process. 
It may be objected that if Rothstein’s 
and Varraich’s arguments are to be 
accepted, then ‘corruption’ can mean 
virtually everything and nothing, and 
that it is better, for both analytical and 
remedial purposes, that governmental 
corruption be understood as bribery, 
kickbacks and manifestly dishonest 
behaviour for private gain. As deputy 
prime minister, in 2009 Bill English paid 
back $32,000 in parliamentary housing 
allowances to which he was not clearly 
entitled under the rules, after his claims 
on the taxpayer had been brought under 
public scrutiny by the Dominion Post. 
The extent to which this affair damaged 
his reputation is not known. However, it 
is unarguable that a prime minister, as 
head of government and primus inter 
pares among his or her Cabinet 
colleagues, while fully entitled – even 
constitutionally obliged – to act as a 
partisan politician,  also has an obligation 
to impartially promote and protect the 
procedural safeguards that are essential 
in maintaining ‘good government’. 
The honorific ‘Right Honourable’ should 
be manifestly justified rather than 
automatically assumed, lest the ancient 
proverb that ‘a fish rots from the head 
down’ is confirmed.
Page 6 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 3 – August 2017
One measure of a political com-
munity’s commitment to seeking and 
maintaining ‘good government’ must be 
its manifest desire to protect the principle 
of impartiality, because if its political 
leaders are expected merely to act only as 
partisan political loyalists, then honour – 
a value that Hager and Stephenson are 
deeply concerned about  – will have little 
relevance in the face of what may be 
widespread political mistrust and 
cynicism, with weakening political 
legitimacy. It seems plausible that the 
head of the government has a particularly 
important role to play, as a necessary but 
insufficient condition to safeguard against 
this. He or she must be and be seen to be 
fair, just and honourable. The honorific 
‘Right Honourable’ should be manifestly 
justified rather than automatically 
assumed, lest the ancient proverb that ‘a 
fish rots from the head down’ is 
confirmed.1 
The prime minister was fully entitled 
to assess the political pros and cons of 
establishing a formal inquiry into the 
claims made by Hager and Stephenson. In 
doing so, he probably came to the view 
that a majority of New Zealanders, if they 
were interested at all in this controversy, 
probably have greater confidence in the 
integrity of the NZDF than in what they 
believe to be a partisan political agenda 
behind the authors’ allegations. Ironically, 
New Zealanders are usually willing to buy 
into other people’s wars one way or 
another – having been involved in a 
multitude of conflicts since our support 
of the United States’ war against the 
Vietnamese 50 years ago – yet we 
perpetuate an Anzac narrative that 
(misleadingly) extols the defence of 
democratic freedoms, while not being 
strongly motivated at home in the defence 
of those perceived liberties. 
A new face of patrimonialism?
As a public service commissioner, my 
father’s bus companion was jointly 
responsible for running a personnel system 
from which political corruption in the form 
of patronage had been formally expunged 
since the introduction of the Public 
Service Act in 1913 (notwithstanding 
the continuation and growth of political 
patronage in the appointments to the 
boards of many state agencies). The 
paradoxical idea of ‘political neutrality’ 
– whereby public servants are required 
to act as if they were faithful and dutiful 
partisans in serving whatever government 
of the day has been legitimately elected to 
office – had become well entrenched. This 
system was, of course, heavily bureaucratic 
and cumbersome, and amidst the neo-
liberal fervour of the times few people 
lamented its passing when the State Sector 
Act 1988 came into force. Yet the unified 
state sector career service was squarely 
grounded on principles of transparency 
and fairness: a complex system of appeals 
was available to anyone who believed that 
as a state sector employee they had not 
been given a ‘fair go’. While it was seen by 
many to comprise excessive red tape, for 
others it provided an essential procedural 
safeguard, at the heart of which was the 
principle of impartiality. 
Today, according to Rothstein and 
Varraich we also see a hybrid system of 
‘neo-patrimonialism’ – not just in the 
public sector – which has the external 
appearance of impartial, legal-rational 
administration but ‘in practice, power 
within the system is exercised according to 
the personal preferences of the leader 
instead of following the prescribed laws in 
place’ (p.92). Although the authors 
themselves do not say so, it can be argued 
that this form of corruption occurs 
whenever an individual is ‘invited’ to 
apply for a formally advertised position – 
which might have been created for the 
prospective applicant – and does so with a 
tacit understanding that he or she will be 
given the job in preference to other, 
perhaps equally qualified, applicants. In 
such cases, the formal rules of job 
specification and recruitment can be 
meticulously followed even though the 
substantive outcome is predetermined. 
Doubtlessly, over the decades legal-
rational administration has always been 
imbued with various degrees of 
patrimonialism – ‘it’s not what you know 
but who you know’, as the saying goes – 
but a widespread ‘shoulder-tapping’ 
approach to governmental employment, 
while it may be good for some individual 
egos, ultimately diminishes people’s trust 
in ‘the system’. At best, governmental 
appointments become increasingly 
restricted to a group of like-minded, 
‘politically sound’ partisans. At worst, 
neo-patrimonialism can enhance the 
scope for ‘trading in influence’ in 
governmental decision-making.   
If ‘greed is good’, so ‘ego is good’: as 
Rothstein and Varraich argue, economistic 
interpretations of political and 
bureaucratic behaviour, especially in the 
form of ‘public choice’ theory, see all 
government officials as being egoistic 
rent-seekers whose behaviour greatly 
devalues the principle of impartiality 
(p.102). In this view, all are seen to be 
corrupt, and corruption becomes, at least 
implicitly, a normative default position, 
supplanting what was once quaintly 
known as ‘the public service ethos’. It can 
also be argued that the impartiality 
embodied in the idea of ‘political 
neutrality’ may have segued from being 
faithful and dutiful service to the elected 
Barring the emergence of a major 
scandal that reeks of corruption as 
commonly understood, it seems 
unlikely that in 2017 the issue of ‘good 
governance’ in New Zealand, let alone 
arcane matters of ‘honour’, will feature 
as pressing election issues.
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government of the day, to becoming a 
spurious justification for protecting 
ministers from legitimate public scrutiny, 
especially by an overly partisan 
manipulation of the requirements of the 
Official Information Act 1982 (Ellis, 2016; 
Rashbrooke, 2017).        
Conclusion: how much do we care?
Barring the emergence of a major scandal 
that reeks of corruption as commonly 
understood, it seems unlikely that in 
2017 the issue of ‘good governance’ in 
New Zealand, let alone arcane matters of 
‘honour’, will feature as pressing election 
issues. We may rest assured that all is well, 
especially as the country is again ranked by 
Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index as the least corrupt in 
the world. Right? A sense of nationalistic 
well-being and evaluations of ‘good 
government’ in ‘Godzone’ are probably 
much more dependent on New Zealand’s 
international sporting success than on 
any concern over the ethical integrity of 
individual political leaders, especially at 
a time when favourable public images 
can be manipulated by sophisticated 
technological means.   
New Zealand is now a far less insular 
and conformist society than it was in the 
1950s, of course, but maybe we have not 
outgrown as much as we like to think we 
have either the authoritarian instincts that 
were displayed in 1951 or – relatedly – the 
national obsession with rugby that 
dominated the national psyche five years 
later. And it is much less likely today that 
two people so separated in occupational 
status would not also be socially separated, 
and therefore less able – and willing – to 
talk together on the Ridgeway bus. 
At that time those men may have 
expressed other priorities, but if I were 
pressed today to nominate a single policy 
initiative that would most significantly 
enhance New Zealand’s prospects for both 
‘better governance’ and a better society, I 
would suggest that, while simultaneously 
protecting and enhancing Radio New 
Zealand’s resources, we find the means to 
establish a dedicated, enlightened and 
impartial public service television system.
1 At the time of writing, the Todd Barclay affair, including Bill 
English’s role in it, was still playing  out in the news media.  
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